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Behaviour change is increasingly promin-
ent in public health and social policy
worldwide. The papers contributed to this
special issue cite numerous examples. The
kinds of intervention highlighted in this
special issue range from conditional cash
transfers, which make use of traditional
models of social welfare payments modi-
fied to encourage particular behaviours
such as school attendance, to incentives to
quit smoking or complete vaccination
schedules, to “nudges” which seek to
affect decision-making by semi-conscious
or unconscious “altering defaults” in the
framing of choices. Sometimes the inten-
tion behind these interventions is to
encourage agents to do things which they
know they want to do, or ought to do, but
find difficult to do in practice; sometimes
the intention is actually to alter agents’
preferences. Sometimes the intended
beneficiary of the change in behaviour is
the agent him or herself; sometimes it is a
third party known to the agent (such as a
child of the agent); sometimes it is for the
benefit of more distant third parties; and
sometimes it is for the general, common,
or public good, however conceived. Here
I am drawing attention to the sheer diver-
sity of aims and intentions and targets of
interventions. It is not, in my view, useful
to make broad brush assumptions about
“behaviour change” interventions as if
they were homogeneous in type, design,
intended effect, mechanism of action, or
underlying ethical norms.
There has been considerable ethical
debate about the ethics of behaviour
change interventions, not only because
these interventions are newly fashionable,
but also because they also because they
seem to set a number of ethical alarm
bells ringing. If one is mainly concerned
with autonomy and liberty, then they
seem to involve methods of suborning the
will of the individual agent. If one is con-
cerned primarily with justice, they seem
to involve unfair burdens on the
economically, socially or psychologically
vulnerable. If one is concerned with the
classical values of public health as collect-
ive action at the societal level, they seem
to involve socially atomistic and individu-
alistic assumptions which corrode solidar-
ity. And so on.
And yet none of this is easy or straight-
forward of proof. For example: incentive
schemes are explicitly addressed to agents,
whereas nudges are not. Yet nudges can
be reflectively endorsed by agents, if they
are drawn to their attention, while incen-
tive schemes may partly depend on
unconscious signals and expectations. So
while at first sight incentives are more
autonomy-respecting and nudges are
more paternalistic, when we focus on the
empirical psychology involved in their
mechanisms of action, things are much
less clear cut. Similarly, we have normative
paradoxes such as this: on the one hand,
incentives to quit smoking will, it is
argued by many critics, unfairly target the
poor, who need the money more, whose
marginal utility of money is higher, and
who are more likely to be patronised and
disapproved of by the “liberal elite”. On
the other, the poor are more likely to
smoke, have a higher burden of disease in
general, and are typically less able to
access healthcare; so a concern with
health inequality should reinforce a com-
mitment to an intervention which is more
likely to benefit the worst off. And while
this paradox in what justice requires needs
considerable theoretical work to resolve,
we then further have the problems that
we have weak evidence that such interven-
tions work even in controlled trials, and
practically speaking no evidence that any
of these effects are detectable in real life,
or that, if detectable, they are persistent.
In effect, we have an ethical debate
whose central feature is a set of arguments
about the rightness or wrongness of inter-
ventions, on the assumption that they
have significant, measurable and occurrent
effects, but in the absence of much reliable
evidence either that they do have such
effects, or that they have those effects fol-
lowing the mechanisms of action we
assume them to have. It is reasonable and
important to have such debates in advance
of the experimental evidence – this is a
(somewhat neglected) branch of research
ethics. It is less clear that it is reasonable
to do so when we do have evidence which
suggests that our working premises are in
fact unsupported by that evidence.
However, a different sort of ethical
debate remains highly pertinent and
worthwhile, and the papers in this special
issue do make valuable contributions to it.
Even though the experimental evidence
for many behaviour change interventions
is negative or at best unimpressive (there
are some exceptions, I concede, particu-
larly in treatment of drug addiction), pol-
icymakers, commercial companies and
many practitioners in public health and
social policy continue to believe other-
wise. Several important questions arise:
why do they do so? Why are the ethical
assumptions made about such interven-
tions so impervious to new information?
What other normative and policy objec-
tives are served by promoting these inter-
ventions, and these ethical frameworks,
beyond the explicit goals of behaviour
change (which are largely not met)? And,
more generally, what are the defaults of
burden of proof in such debates, and how,
if at all, are they rational and justifiable?
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